



After the TEF and Consumer Law Based Interventions – Are Prospective HE 
Students Now Able to Make Informed Choices? 
 
This article argues that recent government interventions in Higher Education – 
some based in consumer law and others in the form of the Teaching Excellence 
Framework ‘TEF’ have failed to put prospective students in a position to make 
informed choices about courses or universities.  Consumer law-based 
interventions do not give students all the information they need, although they 
may help to improve the standard of information and to control marketing 
excess.  The TEF, with its focus on outputs rather than inputs similarly misses 
the mark.  These failures are bad for students, and to the extent that Higher 
Education is a market which depends on students making informed choices, is 
bad for Higher Education.    
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1. Introductory Remarks 
In this article, Higher Education (HE) sector policy initiatives, including the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) and Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) will be 
considered in the light of the Government‟s stated aims of increasing competition and 
quality.
1
 Particular attention will be paid to the role of information in improving quality 
and competition.  Limitations inherent in these initiatives will be suggested and 
consideration will be given as to whether they can be addressed by recent policy 
changes including TEF subject-level pilots.
2
  The article concludes that, while the 
policy changes may not have delivered an effective market, consumer regulation has 
encouraged HE providers to improve the integrity of information available to students 
on their chosen course.  
 
2 Context and Government Policy 
 
The HE sector has been subjected to regulatory reforms that seek to increase 
competition and introduce a market based
3
 HE sector.  Government policy sought to 
encourage the relationship between Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and students 
to be one of business and consumer.
4
  Tuition fees have increased and the cap on 
student numbers has been removed, but questions continue to be raised about whether 
the market can effectively regulate HE to ensure that the 50% increase in funding since 
2007/08 results in improved quality and value for money for students and tax payers.
5
   
There is a paradox in Government policy.  The stated intention is to deregulate 
on the supply side, moving towards what it describes as a “risk based approach”, 
removing barriers to entry.
6
  The hands-off approach, promoting competition so as to 
achieve efficiencies, is not however applied consistently on the demand side.  Instead, 
new forms of intervention, including legal regulation, have been introduced, not least in 
the form of the (TEF) and the (CRA).
7
   
The justification given by Government policy for intervening in HE in the form 
of the CRA and TEF is to improve information available to students, as poor 
information could cause a market failure.
8
  Information in the HE context is seen as an 
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essential element of Government policy to ensure certain desired outcomes.
9
  In terms 
of competition, access to information, which allows the consumer to differentiate 
between providers based on their preferences, was expected to drive effective 
competition in the HE market.
10
 It would encourage HEIs to be responsive to student 
preferences, to “raise their game, offering consumers a greater choice of more 
innovative and better quality products and services”.
11
  Government policy linked the 
need for greater competition within the market with the availability of information and 
good graduate outcomes. Students, as informed consumers, are expected to make better 
informed choices which should enhance “student engagement, satisfaction, retention 
and success whilst at university and employability after university”.
12
 While graduates 
are viewed, at one level, as critical to the UK economy and economic growth,
13
 for the 
graduates themselves, a university education warrants a strong graduate premium and 
low graduate unemployment rates.
14
 With students having invested heavily in their 
higher education, the ability to make an informed choice as to what and where to study 





3 Informed Choice for Students: The Challenges  
This section of the article will review the sources of available information, 
their shortcomings and official responses and reviews from the OFT Call for 
Information in 2014 to the „Augar‟ report in 2019.     
  
Prior to the introduction of the CRA and TEF, information available to 
prospective students included third-party „choice tools‟
16
 such as websites and league 
tables.  These private sources of information were supplemented by the government 
endorsed KIS data on the UniStats website, and information available on HEIs‟ 
websites.  While the information provided through these channels has been regarded as 
increasingly „user-friendly‟,
17
 issues have been identified concerning the quality of the 
information, and access to it.
18
 A Call for Information in 2014 by the OFT on HE in 
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England, dealing with the usefulness and accessibility of existing information, identified 
gaps in  information about the learning experience and course outcomes. Accessibility 
of the information, and the way it was displayed gave cause for concern.
19
 The 
information required to provide a more „rounded‟ picture of the learning environment 
included information on inputs such as contact hours, class size and teaching approach 
as well as employment prospects.
20
  As will be discussed later, TEF has not addressed 
these concerns.  
The 2016 government White Paper which preceded the Higher Education and 
Research Act 2017 concluded that the conditions required to realise a freely competitive 
HE market did not exist. Poor information provision was identified as a key factor, with 
little market pressure on HEIs to present information to differentiate themselves, 
particularly on teaching quality.
21
 Students lack the information required to make an 
informed decision as to what and where to study
22
 which gives little incentive to HEI‟s 
to improve teaching quality. The White Paper seeks to provide “incentives for all 




Nobody would decry the desirability of the availability of valid information to 
help students make the best informed personal choice but HE is considered to be a 
“post-experience good”, where the individual student may not be able to judge the 
personal benefit to them at the start of the course, and possibly not until some time after 
they have graduated.
24
  This limits the effectiveness of information available prior to 
selecting a course and provider for the individual student.  The post-experience nature 
of education also limits the role that ex-ante information can play in promoting 
competition and an efficient market.  As a post-experience good, the quality is not 
known before the student has been through university and quality can be interpreted 
differently by different students.
25
   Although increasing or mandating the availability of 
information can be seen as a low-cost non-intrusive regulation by law makers, its 
consequences can be to deter the adoption of better regulation, and to put burdens on 
enterprises while actually impairing consumers‟ decisions.  Consumers can be 
overwhelmed by a surfeit of information and make economically rational decisions to 
ignore much of it.
26
   This places limits on how effectively the increase of information 
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and reliance on student choice can meet the wider objectives such as the enhancement 
of quality of teaching.
27
  
The Review of Post-18 Education and Funding, led by Dr Philip Augar, 
concluded in 2019 that the removal of the control of student numbers, and a high fee 
cap aimed at creating a competitive market have failed to deliver competition on price, 
nor is competition on quality apparent.
28
  What competition there is appears to be for 
student numbers, with universities attempting to compete in the area of student 
experience, with increased spending on campus facilities, and also inducements such as 
lower entry requirements and unconditional offers.  Of direct relevance to the question 
of the standard of information available to students is the sector‟s noticeable increase in 
its marketing effort, and the increased professionalism of that effort. The Augar report 
cautioned that Universities should maintain a sense of proportion in their marketing 
strategies and budgets.      
    
4 The First Response: Consumer Law-Based Interventions 
4.1 Consumer Law and Government Policy  
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) considers that an effective 
system of consumer protection law can be an adequate source of market regulation to 
protect consumers provided they are “well informed about what they are purchasing, 
and not at risk of being significantly harmed by poor quality”. 
29
  Responses to the OFT 
CFi raised concerns that there were significant gaps in the information available to 
students as well as concerns about the accessibility of terms and conditions, the ability 
of students to understand them, and the extent to which they are fair and 
proportionate.
30
 The CMA published advice to help HEIs comply with consumer 
protection law and understand their responsibilities towards undergraduate students.
31
 
The advice focuses on information provision terms and conditions and complaint 
handling and processes.
32
 The Augar report has highlighted the sector‟s increased 
marketing activities.  Consumer protection law has an important role to play to ensure 
the accuracy of the marketing information.         
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4.2 Consumer Law and Information 
With regard to information provision, the advice covers the information that 
must be provided to prospective students at three stages: research and application stage, 
offer stage and enrolment stage.
33
 For prospective students researching their choice of 
subject and institution, the focus of the consumer protection legislation is the imposition 
of a general duty not to make a misleading omission or, put more positively, for 
„material information‟ to be provided in a way which is clear, intelligible, unambiguous 
and timely.
34
 „Material Information‟ refers to the information which the average 
consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision.
35
 
In this regard, the CMA highlights the importance to students of having full information 
about their courses and fees upfront.
36
   
The intention of the CRA is to consolidate consumer law rights and obligations 
in one place. While the applicable information provisions discussed remain outside the 
scope of the Act, anything that is said or written pre-contract to the student in the 
provision of that information, e.g. in the prospectus, is treated as a term of the contract 
if taken into account by the student in deciding to enter into the contract.
37
 The CRA 
further consolidates the existing unfair terms legislation
38
 and all contracts, rules and 
regulations that students are bound by are subject to the test of fairness under the Act.
39
 
The contract between the HEI and student is one for the provision of educational 
services under the Act and as such it provides that the service will be performed with 
reasonable care and skill.
40
 The CRA provides additional remedies, alongside the usual 
common law remedies, for breach of that duty and in the provision of inaccurate 
information with the introduction of a right to require repeat performance or a price 
reduction. 
41
 The practicalities of having recourse to such remedies for poor teaching 
provision, and specifically repeat performance in the HE context, has however been 
questioned, as it can result in a loss of funding, career opportunities and living costs.
42
   
Students rarely transfer provider and will not recover fees unless they can demonstrate 
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that they were misled.
43
  The value and deterrent effect on the HEIs of these remedies 
may well be limited.  The lack of empowered consumers who can switch providers 
without financial penalty does not promote an effective market.
44
     
4.3 Consumer Law and Compliance  
Following publication of its advice, the CMA commenced a compliance review 
to establish whether the advice had been successful in raising awareness among HEIs of 
their consumer law obligations and whether compliance had improved. It further sought 
to identify whether evidence of non-compliance remained.
45 
While the review 
confirmed that awareness among HE providers had increased significantly with 
examples of positive change in practice, there were also examples of non-compliance, 
including with regard to the accessibility and adequacy of information provided to 
prospective students, for example in relation to additional course costs and 
undergraduate degree course variation.
46
  As such, consumer protection legislation to 
date has raised awareness of the need to provide accurate information but it is less clear 
whether it acts as an adequate source of market regulation to protect the interests of 
students as consumers and as an effective incentive to improve the quality of HE 
teaching provision. While the CRA introduces new remedies, the value of these 
remedies to consumers and their deterrent effect against breach by HEIs may be limited.  
Compliance with consumer protection provisions and specifically those set out in the 
CMA guidance continues to be a focus of regulation under the oversight of the Office 
for Students (OfS) which, as a consumer focused, sole market regulator, is also charged 
with administering the TEF
47
 and which has a role to play in responding to the 
recommendations in the Augar report.
48
 
5 The Second Response: the Teaching Excellence Framework 
5.1 TEF and Government Policy 
The on-going work to improve HEIs‟ compliance with consumer protection 
legislation, the proliferation of available information in the form of KIS and league 
tables, and the  post-experience nature of higher education which limits the impact 
information has on effective competition, has not diminished the Government‟s 
inclination to intervene.  Improving information available to HE applicants is seen as 
essential for effective competition and the maintenance of quality.
49
  The CMA found 
that the HE sector in England is to a large extent characterised by healthy competition 
between providers which have a strong reputational incentive to provide high quality 
                                                 
43
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education and to actively compete for students, but still concluded that students find it 
difficult to assess the quality of courses before they start.  A wrong choice can result in 
a poor learning experience and long term detriment to career outcomes, which justifies 
the need for further regulation.
50
  The White Paper maintained that good quality 
teaching results in good graduate outcomes and as such teaching quality should be 
among the „key drivers‟ of a prospective student‟s choice and their investment in HE.
51
 
The information available to students however “can be hard to find, inconsistent and 
inadequate, making it hard to form a coherent picture of where excellence can be found 
within and between different higher education providers”.
52
 Further, the White Paper 
advances the view that the type of information available (and required under consumer 
protection legislation) fails to match students‟ needs and priorities.
53
  
The TEF seeks to address these shortcomings with existing information 
provision by introducing “sector-wide rigour to the assessment of teaching 
excellence.”
54
  The Government‟s position is that TEF provides “clear, understandable 
information” to students, supported by a rating system which indicates where teaching 
quality is outstanding, with the aim of making it clear to students where the best 
provision can be found. It should inform competition within the HE market and drive up 
the standards of quality as a result.
55
   
5.2 Teaching Excellence Framework shortcomings  
The purpose behind the TEF is laudable and all-encompassing: to better inform 
students about what and where to study, to raise esteem for teaching, to recognise and 
reward excellent teaching and better meet the needs of employers, business, industry 
and the professions in identifying the best graduates.
56
  The priorities, in assessing 
quality and in choosing what and where to study, were identified as contact hours, class 
size and lecturer training, for which a lack of information is said to exist.
57
  These input 
metrics did not appear in the second version of TEF „TEF2‟ but were intended to appear 
in some guise in the TEF subject level pilot study.  TEF takes quantitative data from the 






 and the Destination of Leavers 
Survey from Higher Education (DLHE).
61
  These metrics have been criticised as 
unreliable „proxy‟ measures of quality in learning and teaching in HE.
62
  In addition, a 
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15-page written statement by the providers
63
  defined the metrics by which teaching 
excellence should be judged by the criteria of: teaching quality, learning environment 
and student outcomes and learning gain.
64
   
It was said that the link between TEF and increase in student fees was worth £1 
billion
65
 which was seen as an incentive to HEI to focus on education, but this figure 
should be viewed in the context of the existing £28 billion University income, the 
majority of which comes from education.
66
  If education income has not driven market 
forces to improve the quality of education provision before TEF, it is by no means 
certain that it will do so subsequently.  The conversion of existing information into a 
simplified eye-catching label is more likely to feed into the reputational differentiation 
of universities.  The results of TEF2 have not disturbed the Oxbridge and Russell Group 
reputational position.
67
    
5.3 All outputs, no inputs 
TEF uses existing data as proxies for teaching quality.  The extent to which 
these give a valid picture of quality has been subject to criticism elsewhere.
68
  The 
concern addressed here is that, while other pre-existing data sets did not ignore inputs 
such as staff student ratios (SSR),
69
 to date TEF is based entirely on outputs.  The TEF 
benchmarking process
70
 does not take account of the impact of factors such as tariff 
entry points and cross-subsidising of courses and other input data.  This is surprising 
considering that the Government acknowledges that what “best predicts educational 
gain is measures of educational process: what institutions do with their resources to 
make the most of whatever students they have.”
71
  The various Government reports 
discussed in this paper acknowledge the role of inputs such as contact hours but there is 
evidence that Russell Group and Gold-rated institutions tend to have the largest class 
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63
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68
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  When surveyed as part of the TEF implementation process, students considered 
class size as one of the least important factors for determining quality.
73
 There is 
however evidence that students may learn more in smaller groups
74
 and that contact 
hours and large class sizes are considered to have impacts on students‟ perception, 
engagement and depth of learning.
75
  Rather than relying on a survey of applicants and 
students, further research appears to be needed to support decisions about optimum 
class size and contact hours in HE.     
The pilot on teaching intensity, as part of the subject level pilot, sought to 
redress the balance between outputs and inputs.
76
   The teaching intensity pilot looked at 
class sizes and SSR per class through two metrics: hours and group size, although it did 
not differentiate between teaching by lectures or seminars or grade and experience of 
staff.  A weighting based on number of hours taught by the SSR for each hour gave a 
Gross Teaching Quotient.
77
   To increase validity, data was taken not only from 
providers but also took into account students‟ perception of whether the contact hours 
were sufficient for their studies.  This data was intended to be supplementary to the 
subject-level metrics and considered as part of the holistic judgement in the second step 
alongside other narrative background information submitted by providers.  It was hoped 
the pilot would inform the extent to which the assessors could use the teaching intensity 
data to make judgements and how to expand the collection of the data in the future.
78
  It 
may also contribute evidence on the relationship between teaching intensity and 
teaching excellence.
79
  Following the subject level consultation in 2018, measuring 
teaching intensity was removed from TEF.
80
  Neither the respondents to the 
consultation, mainly HEIs, or the TEF panel members thought the measure meaningful.  
The Government also referred to the research commissioned as part of the TEF review, 
to claim that teaching intensity was of low relative importance in student decision 
making.
81
  As discussed earlier the validity of this research in determining the quality of 
education requires further research and evaluation.   
While teaching intensity was dropped, metrics on Longitudinal Education 
Outcomes (LEO) data looking at employment and earnings outcomes up to 5 years after 
graduation will be included as a core metric, in addition to the existing graduate salary 
metric from the DLHE survey.
82
  This is said to „strengthen the way that TEF holds 
providers to account for delivering excellent teaching‟.  However, rather than trying to 
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assess the quality of activity in the classroom, greater emphasis is being placed on 
economic factors such as graduate earnings.  TEF is moving towards a rating based on 
economic data supplemented by the provider‟s narrative.  LEO measures concrete data 
but its value may be lost when combined with other proxies to give the simplistic TEF 
rating.  If the objective is to improve information available to students, then the wider 
publicity and availability of LEO will allow students to consider the information 
themselves.   
The result of the Government consultation is that TEF, at both provider and 
subject levels, relies entirely on outputs.  Omitting inputs such as tariff entry points, 
SSR, contact hours and class size will influence the actions HEIs will take to improve 
their TEF rating.  Research indicates that there is a perception that TEF may have 
contributed to increased activity on employability, student support, and initiatives to 
improve teaching standards and qualifications but also a decrease in teaching morale 
particularly for Bronze award providers.
83
  It looks as though TEF will remain.  The 
Secretary of State for Education when outlining his priorities in September 2019
84
, 
urged the Office for Students to publish a subject level TEF in 2021 and implement a 
new TEF model, following the government response to the independent review of the 
TEF led by Dame Shirley Pearce, publication of which was awaited at the time of 
writing.   
     
5.4 Government policy has lost important policy levers   
TEF was intended to inform students on teaching quality but the metrics are 
increasingly focused on economic outputs after graduation.  By contrast students have 
little information from TEF or HEIs on how the money they borrow to fund their 
education is spent.  Government policy to deregulate the sector and introduce student 
loans, in a failed attempt to reduce the budget deficit,
85
 has lost the Government an 
important policy lever.  The relative per student income to the HEI for providing 
different courses has changed.  The higher cost „Group A‟ courses such as medicine saw 
income increase by only 6% between 2011 and 2017.  For „Group D‟, low-cost 
humanities courses, funding increased by 47%.  The Augar report observed that 
increasing student loans and reducing grant funding resulted in the funding of some 
subjects increasing at twice the rate of others and that this difference bore relationship 
with the cost of provision.
86
  The Augar report recognised this as an unintended 
consequence of HE funding policy which has resulted  in the apparent over funding of 
low cost subjects and the underfunding of high cost subjects.  Universities UK‟s 
submission to the Augar report recognised that the £9000 fee is well in excess of the 
£7500 average cost of providing undergraduate courses but falls far short cost of more 
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expensive subjects such as £22,000 for veterinary science. This could influence 
Universities‟ incentives to move from the more expensive STEM subjects to „chalk and 
talk‟ subjects such as Law.  There has already been a higher increase in students 
studying social sciences and business administration than STEM subjects with the 
Government spending 30 per cent more per student on creative arts degrees than 
engineering degrees.
87
    The Government‟s ability to influence and encourage more 
students to enter STEM subjects is reduced, which is at odds with its Industrial Strategy.              
5.5 Increase in resources should be matched by increase in disclosure  
University income from fees has increased by 25% since the 2012 funding 
reforms.
88
  This increase has outstripped wider public spending and GDP growth and 
impacts the Government deficit by over £10 billion.
 89
  The increased income and move 
to a market based approach to HE has not been accompanied by any significant review 
of governance of HEIs, nor any increase in financial disclosure requirements.  While 
TEF has increased the focus on projected student earnings, an economic output, there is 
no consideration of differing financial inputs.  When income for HE was entirely state 
provided and more modest, oversight by Government bodies such as HEFCE might 
have been adequate.  The significant real terms rise in HE funding, in comparison with 
other sectors and international comparators requires more public scrutiny.  The Augar 
report questioned UK Universities‟ size of surplus at £1000 per student while 
proportionally less was spent on direct teaching than counterparts overseas.  There is 
also evidence of a wide disparity of spend on similar subjects at apparently similar 
institutions.   
Government policy has encouraged the risk of maintaining quality to remain 
almost entirely with students and taxpayers rather than being transferred to the 
institutions.  In an era of increasing income from fees, governance of HE providers and 
the information on how they spend their students and tax payers‟ money appears to be 
inadequate.   
Higher education is one of the largest financial commitments any young person 
can make, the cost of which they have to repay over their working life.  Only 20% of 
students consider they are given enough information on how their fees are spent.
90
  
While a few HE providers do volunteer information on financial spending in a user 
friendly form, the practice is not as ubiquitous as it is for local authorities or even 
privatised utilities.  It should become obligatory for HE providers to disclose how their 
spending is split between research, education, estates, administration and how much is 
spent per student on particular courses of study.  The move to subject level TEF is an 
opportunity for HE providers to disclose spending per student by course.  
Students studying the low-cost „Group D‟ courses could consider not only their 
earning potential but also whether their fees are cross subsidising other students.  Full 
transparency would also ensure that increased funding benefits the student and their 
education.
91
  Some of the financial data might be complex but it could be re-packaged 
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by third party intermediaries, including the private league tables, to be user friendly for 
potential students.    Disclosure and transparency would also allow for better 
independent scrutiny of individual HE providers financial and management 
performance.   
6. Conclusion 
Recent changes to consumer regulation, including the CRA, have delivered an 
ethos in which HEIs take greater care in the information provided to applicants and 
students.  This is important to check any excesses of marketing when other policy 
changes have resulted in an increase in funding but have not delivered an effective 
market for price or the quality of education.  TEF was intended to focus HEIs on 
teaching quality.  It appears to be too early to say if this has made a significant impact 
on teaching quality or student decision making.  Forthcoming changes such as subject 
level TEF appear unlikely to include teaching quality inputs rather than economic 
outputs, but the independent review of the TEF led by Dame Shirley Pearce may 
address this.  This and government implementation of recommendations in the Augar 
report are an opportunity to address a number of shortcomings, but the existence of a 
market in higher education has been called into question, and the policy of relying on 
information to regulate quality has significant limitations.  As the increase in spending 
on higher education has outstripped other sectors and now gives a significant surplus, 
there should be a corresponding increase in disclosure and transparency.  Students 
should have access to more information on how their fees are spent, including, 
crucially, the costs of providing their chosen course.        
 
 
